Combat Capability [42%], Role and Missions, Structure of the Navy, in-service ships, surface ships, submarines, chronology.
|Tell a friend||Print version|
Major Problems in Establishing of the Modern Navy
Politico-Military Side of the Development of the Ocean-going Navy
The Designing of Theoretical Foundation of the Development of Nuclear-Missile Weapon and Modern Ocean-Going Navy
Construction of the Navy and Taking the Oceans
The Challenges the Science Encountered During the Period of Military-Strategic Parity
The Issues the Navy and Science Faced During 1986-1996
Military Related Technical Problems of Establishment and Development of the Modern Navy Command and Control Systems and Ways of their Solution
USA as the primary superpower leading coalition of the states opposed to socialist camp and separated from the latter and the majority of its allies by oceans and seas in the military construction favored the naval forces and their missile-nuclear component in particular centering about 65-75% of their nuclear capabilities at the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (NPBMS).
The scheme of combat patrols of NPBMS was like a clock-work: two thirds of 41 missile carrying submarines (60’s-70’s) were in commission (the rest had been undergoing repairs), the half of them had been at sea on combat patrols (the ratio of level readiness (RLR) = 0.67, sea-to-base ratio (SBR) = 0.5). The same situation can be observed even now although the number of SSBN of Trident class in commission decreased to 16-17 units.
Out of over 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines commissioned in the US Navy in the 70’s from 15 to 22 of them had been at sea at combat patrol on permanent basis meeting anti-submarine and intelligence tasks (SBR about 0.2) including Barents Sea, Seas of Okhotsk and Japan in many cases trespassing USSR marginal waters. From the 60’s US nuclear-powered attack submarines regularly started to explore the area of the Arctic and still expanding their presence there nowadays.
Out of 16-20 operational US aircraft-carriers 3-4 of them had been cruising off the European and Asian coasts. Currently US Navy comprises 12 aircraft-carriers (including 7 nuclear-powered) and their number in the frontline Task Groups remained almost the same.
In order to ensure stationing of their nuclear submarine forces (SSBN) in Europe the USA rented the bases in Holy-Loch (Great Britain) and Rota (Spain) the bases in Naples and Augusta for the carrier groups were rented in the Mediterranean, in Asia the submarines were assigned to Apra-Bay at Guam and the carriers to the ports of Yokosuka and Subic-Bay. Currently these bases are closed down. At the same time the USA seeming to consider the Mediterranean the most important area from geopolitical and strategic standpoints. US Naval Squadron located there since the war time in the late 40’s was reorganized into the 6th Fleet functioning as a tool for strategic politico-military leverage not only at Arab states opposing US’s allies and Israel in particular but at nations of socialist camp with the USSR in lead as well. From 1963 till 1967 the amount of SSBN on patrol and with missiles aimed at this country had been increased in the Mediterranean theater from 2 to 10. The main body of the 6th Fleet comprised two aircraft-carriers, two cruisers, four frigates, and over ten destroyers. In the Pacific and Indian Oceans the USA were represented the 7th Task Fleet with number of ships variable due to the situation namely from 50 to 225 naval and auxiliary ships and complement strength from 58 to 87 thousand men.
USA introduced new types of armament in the second half of the 70’s - antiship missiles Harpoon and Tomahawk. Alongside with the increase of US Navy the bloc-allied navies of Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Japan and other also saw considerable increase and development.
Thus the post-war politico-military situation featured constant increase of the naval forces and revitalization of blocs activities with the USA in the lead openly directed against the Soviet Union assuming to solve strategic issues and thus implementing the concept of “war conducting from the sea against the land”. This concept provided for delivering strikes by nuclear weapons of the submarines and ship-based air forces to the territory of the Soviet Union and army supply lines in Europe. In other words the expected war could have been performed with the assistance of naval forces only from with the main body of the latter consisted of the attack aircraft-carriers and SSBN.
As the result the nations of the socialist commonwealth under USSR found themselves surrounded by the opposing party from the seas and oceans. In order to lift such a “blockade” it was required to command a powerful ocean-going navy, with the main striking force of the latter consisting of nuclear-powered submarines. In addition the geostrategic location of the Soviet Union without oversea bases pressed the naval forces to make their way on considerable distance, force crossing of narrow waters and channels frequently controlled by NATO Allied Naval Forces (ANF) that in turn was possible with the most surreptitious forces only. The submarines appeared to be the very efficient force to stand against the powerful surface fleet. The same role could have been performed by aircraft-carriers and the issue of their construction was addressed in the government that time. But for the country rising with much difficulty the economy had ruined by the late war the construction of such capital ships was definitely a back-breaking burden. However this issue had always being in the focus and the steps were taken gradually for its materialization. The decision taken of primary construction of the highly-efficient forces nowise meant the cold storage of surface fleet development. In the end of 40’s - 50’s yet about one third of the total funding for the Navy purposes was allocated for the surface fleet.
The development of the ocean-going navy took a bit of doing from the nation for the long post-war period that can be relatively divided into four stages:
- 1946-1955 – designing of theoretical foundation for the development of nuclear-missile weapon and structure of modern ocean-going navy, mass production of diesel-driven submarines, medium and small size surface ships;
- 1956-1975 – the stage of ocean-going navy construction, presence of the Navy in the World Ocean;
- 1975-1985 – achievement and sustaining of military-strategic parity of the Navy with NATO ANF;
- 1986-1996 – the stage of justification finding of the Navy’s proposals with regard to efficiency increase and their implementation in the radically changed geopolitical situation in the world.
The Designing of Theoretical Foundation for the Development of Nuclear-Missile Weapon and Structure of the Modern Ocean-Going Navy (Navy Construction Start 1946-1955)The post-war period in construction of the Armed Forces of the country in general and the Navy in particular featured increased role of both fundamental and applied including military science. It became constitutive due to sophistication of selection and decision making with regard to development of weapons and military equipment. It became obvious that the up-to-date engineering solutions were simply impossible without advancing of basic research as only empirical knowledge (as before) was not enough for solution finding.
In this context it should be remembered what dedicated efforts were applied by I.V. Kurchatov, A.D. Sakharov, A.P. Aleksandrov and other distinguished scholars and research teams ruled by them in order to develop not only theoretical basis of thermonuclear weapon but the weapon itself. As the result the Soviet Union only four years later carried out nuclear tests imposing shock on the governments of the former allies especially United States that previously solely possessed the atomic bomb and rather straightforwardly threatened the Soviet Union with it. Under such circumstances only the possession of own nuclear weapon could guard against the outside aggression.
Along with the development of the nuclear weapon the issues regarding the grounding and designing of weapon delivery means had been addressed. The development of ballistic and winged missiles for different purposes was advancing rather quick and steadily. In charge of these schools were academicians S.P. Korolev, V.N. Chalomei, V.P. Makeev and others. The achievements in the rocket and missile engineering appeared to be so significant that it became possible to perform the first in the world submarine firing in 1955 already (the chief designer of the missile system - S.P. Korolev, submarine’s CO – Captain of the II rank F.I. Kozlov, head of submarine’s missile division - Senior Lieutenant S.F. Bondin). Simultaneously with military rocket and missile engineering the science made progress to the benefit of cosmic exploration. The Soviet Union was the first to launch artificial satellite in 1957 and the first man get to the earth orbit in 1961.
Despite of the main emphasis of the first post-war decade on the construction of diesel-driven submarines the question of nuclear powered submarines construction as nuclear delivery vehicles was posed that time already. In 1952 V.N. Peregudov was assigned to take the lead in construction of the first Soviet nuclear-powered submarine. His weight as a scholar, designer and manager was exceptionally high. His teammates called Vladimir Nikolaevich “Tupolev in shipbuilding” and Academician A.P. Alexandrov equalized his gift with I.V. Kurchatov’s. Of course V.N. Peregudov was not the only one to design the submarine. The series of eminent scientists took direct participation in sub’s project and in particular the chief designer of the reactor Academician N.A. Dollezhal, laureates of State and Lenin Prize G.A. Voronin, G.A. Gasanov, P.D. Degtyarev, V.P. Goryachev, V.I. Pershin, G.I. Kapyrin and many others. These gifted specialists had to solve the most complicated scientific and engineering issues under tight schedule. Their work equal to a heroic deed was crowned with success namely with the launch of the first Soviet nuclear-powered submarine K-3 (the Leninskiy Komsomol, project 627) and in 1958 her CO Captain of the I rank L.G. Osipenko in the presence of Commander-In-Chief of the Navy Admiral S.G. Gorshkov hoisted the naval flag. It took only a decade to increase the number of the Soviet nuclear submarines to 50! The development of the modern ocean-going navy (including nuclear submarines) required solution of scientific and engineering challenges related to shipbuilding improvement, power generation, weapon, radio detection, hydroacoustics, communication, navigation, control, etc.
During the first post-war decade it was built and commissioned 248 diesel-driven submarines and 619 surface ships. Table 1 shows that by the end of the decade about 80% (482 units) of the commissioned surface ships fall on the small crafts of the “mosquito fleet”, the end of the decade also demonstrates the tendency for the increase in construction of capital ships. For total by 1955 the Navy (including ships constructed during the pre-war and wartime periods) comprised 265 diesel-driven submarines and about 900 surface ships (about 80% of them were coastal crafts).
Table 1. The amount of ships commissioned for the Navy during 1946-1955
The tendency for growth of construction of diesel-driven submarines should be noted. Such a tendency proves demonstratively the increasing economical power of the Soviet Union that had managed to dig up the resources for erection of shipbuilding plants and basing sites for the Navy during difficult post-war years of recovery.
Table 2. The amount of submarines commissioned for the Navy during 1956-75
By the end of the period under review the parity with the opposing side in submarines amount was achieved. The construction of the surface ships during the mentioned period suffered considerable difficulties. The Commander-In-Chief of the Navy Admiral Sergey Georgievish Gorshkov as well as his predecessor Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov adhered to the construction of the ocean-going fleet including surface fleet comprising aircraft-carriers and other seagoing surface ships. But the objectively needed reduction in Armed Forces that followed in the early 60’s led to the decommission of seven entirely new cruisers (including the ones finished in construction). Yet despite the subjectivity of decisions taken S.D. Gorshkov was able to convince the government on the necessity of the construction of the Navy that would meet the security interests of the nation.
After 1964 the dispute around development of aircraft-carrying fleet reappeared. On one side of the fence standing against the construction of aircraft-carriers were the Director of USA and Canada Institute Academician G.A. Arbatov, Deputy Head of the General Staff Admiral N.N. Amelko and some others. The other side was represented by the Head of Naval Academy Admiral V.N. Ponikarovskiy, specialists from several Naval Research Institutes who produced reasons and correctly considered it impossible to carry out any operations at sea without air supremacy (including combat support of submarines).
The second standpoint gained the upper hand and as the result the early 70’s witnessed the designing and construction of aircraft-carrying ships of project 1143. Yet the ships of this project had been carrying vertical takeoff and landing aircrafts and the latter had comparatively low airspeed and ceiling, small cruising range and the anti-ship missiles with firing range of about 500-600 km, all this made it impossible to match adversary’s Carrier Task Groups.
Anyway the construction of the ocean-going navy in the Soviet Union went heavily on although not without blunders and deviations of both objective and subjective nature. During 1956-1975 it was commissioned about 900 surface ships of various purposes, including over 400 of landing ships, over 300 mine-sweepers, 7 cruisers (including 4 missile cruisers of project 58), 30 destroyers, 68 corvettes. Due to the considerable “threat from underwater” high priority was given to antisubmarine issues. At the same time there were constructed two helicopter carrier cruisers of project 1123 (Moskva and Leningrad), 45 large submarine-hunters of projects 61 and 1134 of various modifications.
At the same time the possession of the great amount of ships capable to work tasks at sea was not yet the same as ocean-going navy build-up. The navy could be considered as ocean-going when being at sea the ships could fulfill tasks at the highest degree of preparedness in time of peace.
So the presence of the constant threat from oceans and seas from foreign Navies that partially was at the level readiness to use nuclear weapon not only against land targets inside USSR but underwater aims as well, forced us to proceed to act more aggressively and send ships from time to time for long-haul cruises. Those ships were to scout the activities of the naval Task Forces of the opposing nations.
Certainly that time the primary objective for the West from geopolitical standpoint was the Mediterranean area. That is why the Soviet naval forces started to acclimate it yet in the 50’s. Before the mid 50’s the Mediterranean theater saw 5 detachments of Soviet naval ships. Starting August 1958 Albanian government approved stationing of four diesel-driven submarines in the Bay of Valera. This number was increased to 12 submarines in a year. But in 1962 due to the tension between the governments the detachments ceased to exist with 8 submarines redeployed and the rest left in Albania.
Along with the Mediterranean the Soviet navy had been exploring other areas. For instance in summer 1962 nuclear-powered submarine K-3 (project 627) made the first in the navy history a cruise to the North Pole under Arctic ice. In autumn 1963 submarines K-115 (project 627A) and K-178 (project 658) were redeployed from the Northern to Pacific Fleet through the Arctic. K-181 submarine (project 627A) planned to perform under-ice cruise in the Arctic. The first combat patrol in the North-Eastern Atlantic was carried out in spring 1963 by K-107 (project 629) and from July to September K-133 (project 627A) was the first to explore equatorial zone. Next year two nuclear submarines were transferred from the Northern to Pacific Fleet.
The forces of the Pacific Fleet had been exploring the areas of the Pacific, Philippine, East China Seas and Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. In 1964 there were 5 cruises made into these areas, 12 in 1965, 27 (including 10 made by nuclear subs) in 1966. In other words increase in Navy’s numbers led to an increase of cruises to the remote areas and occasional cruises of nuclear subs had been transformed into the regular basis and these combat patrols served as the prime way of sustaining combat readiness of the Fleets. Should during the first two post-war decades the issue of combat readiness increase had been resolved by perfection of means for increasing of preparedness depending on the current situation than in later years it sustained qualitative changes based on the tactical employment of the forces in peace time on the regular basis initiated in the mid 60’s. Table 3 represents the number of combat patrols of the naval forces from 1965 till 1976.
Table 3. The number of combat cruises of the Navy in 1965-1976
Table 3 demonstrates the advancement in number of combat patrols of nuclear submarines including ballistic-missile submarines and surface ships but the cruises of diesel-driven submarines gradually decreased.
Thus established in the early 60’s the system of combat service as the primary counter-move against activities of NATO ANF by mid 70’s had already passed several stages of its making developing from patrols of single ships or groups and detachments of vessels to organization of systems of task and contingency forces, from occasional and short-run tracking of opponent’s attack groups to gaining sea supremacy in vital areas of the World Ocean, from single instances of patrols of diesel-driven submarines armed with ballistic-missiles (project 629) to organization of system capable to maintain the highest level of readiness of naval strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) when specific number of NPBMS situated at sea at combat duty at the preset level of readiness for delivery of strikes to the targets in the territory of a supposed adversary at any distance from this country. Should in 1965 the combat patrols were carried out by one submarine armed with ballistic-missiles, 5 nuclear attack submarines, 5 diesel-driven submarines, 25 surface ships then in 1976 they amounted to 38, 30, 59, and 111 respectively. For the ten years of combat service the missile-nuclear capability deployed at seas had increased more than in 200 times, the number of combat patrols of submarines increased sixfold, surface ships more than fourfold and the amount of supplies delivered to the combat service forces in 120 times.
The main features of naval combat service in peacetime were (as opposed to the activities of the other branches of the Armed Forces) the following:
- Vast areal range (should in the 60’s combat patrols covered only 30% of the World Ocean then in the 70’s the area increased to 80%);
- Considerable remoteness of operational areas from the bases and home country (up to 12-15 thousand kilometers), the areas where no other branches of the Armed Forces can operate;
- Direct contact with the naval component of the opposing nations in conditions of active interference from them (scouting and tracking with usage of electronic blanketing and other).
The main principles of combat service in 60’s-70’s were the following:
- Mustering strength against the main naval groups that posed the greatest threat;
- Keeping contact with the main attack groups of foreign nations in the set areas and especially in the most tense periods of time;
- Set of reserves for timely build-up of combat service forces;
- Compliance of objectives with current situation and initial plans;
- Compliance of force structure and their tactical set-up with the objectives;
- Strict compliance with deception and concealment mode for the forces on combat service;
- Full-scale support of the combat service forces;
- Close cooperation between groups of combat service forces, reserve force, troops and units of other branches of the Armed Forces, assigned for joint operations;
- Reliable command of the combat service forces.
The combat service at that time answered the most efficient alternative of forces usage and provided for their redeployment, increase and replenishment of materials.
The second half of the 70’s posed the following objectives for the combat service:
- Combat patrols of ballistic-missile submarines;
- Combat support of NPBMS in order to provide combat stability in case of hostilities break out;
- Scouting and tracking foreign nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic-missiles, and be at level readiness to destroy them from the very beginning of a war;
- Tracking carrier and other groups of foreign navies in the set areas and be at level readiness to use weapon against the primary targets.
In connection with the frequent instances of foreign naval crafts (including scouts) spotting off our coasts in many cases within marginal waters of the USSR there was another challenge to appear namely deliberate denial of foreign reconnoitering in the vicinity of our coasts.
Aside from the combat service, the naval forces on the regular basis had been participating at military exercises carried out under the Ministry of Defense. There were deployed about 30 surface ships, 42 submarines (8 nuclear, 4 diesel-driven armed with rockets and 30 attack submarines) during the first major exercises of the Northern Fleet in summer 1965 (codename Pechora). During Okean-70 exercises the Northern Fleet was represented by 60 surface ships and 40 submarines (including 10 nuclear-powered) and the Pacific Fleet had 32, 28 (9) respectfully.
The figures for other exercises are the following:
Okean-75: Northern Fleet: 38, 35 (13) – Pacific Fleet: 21, 24(10);
Sever -77: Northern Fleet: 19, 22 (10);
Raduga -77: Pacific Fleet: 11, 21 (10);
Okean-80: Both Fleets: over 70, 50 (including 21 NPBMS).
While the exercises the missile submarines had been practicing to perfection the transition to the highest level of readiness for strikes delivery with the rest of the of the forces supporting their stability by means of training in destruction of carrier air groups, convoys, landing forces and submarines sweeping.
Mass production of the ocean-going navy and its presence in the oceans delivered a set of problems to the government and resolving of it required further development of military science and perfecting of research methods. One of the major issues was the further construction of the navy not as the given set of naval crafts but as the unified combat system comprising several subsystems namely strike (crafts and weapon proper), support (combat support forces), command and control (means of control and communication), maintenance (means of technical assistance and logistic support). Handling of this issue required theoretical justifications of navy’s balance not only between different branches of the navy but directly between the branches and their infrastructure as well with the main justification criterion “efficiency vs. cost”. Due to continuous enhancement of naval warfare means, considerable reduction of submarines noise, development of precision long range weapons the problem appeared related to battle support of the forces including provision of intelligence data and target marking. Increasing of speed for the “delivery” of weapon to the remote targets required enhancement control and command methods on the basis of automation principles. The military science also faced a problem of naval operations improvement with regard to selection of the most proper way to run such operations as well as strategic and tactical principles of naval forces usage.
Solution of the first issue was assigned to the Ministry of Defense Research & Development (R & D) Institutes (that had been “rendering services” to the Navy, as for the second issue it was basically covered by the Naval Academy.
Therefore it was necessary to encourage the progress of the military science as much as possible because the further development was almost impossible without implementation of the latest achievements in radio electronics and application of military cybernetics practices. Regrettably in the first post-war years the development of the cybernetics was checked on account of purely subjective reasons. Yet the first half of the 50’s all the sectors of the national economy and security saw the quick advancement of computing technology. Under very tight schedule there had been developed and commissioned the first Soviet computing machines such as Strela, Ural, BESM, portable units M-2, M-3 and others.
One of the premier positions in development of the new means and equipment was taken by the military scientific institutions working on the needs of the Navy. In December 1952 the Deputy of Naval Minister Admiral N.E. Basistiy took a decision on establishment of the Naval Computation Centre (CC) with the authorities equal to R & D Institutes. The staff list of the Center was approved in August 1955 and at the same time the constriction site in Petrodvorets was allocated. In November 1955 the CC came into operation already. Initially the CC was focused upon complicated computation applicable to the designing of new types of weapon and military equipment as well as to resolving of tactical tasks. The outcome was not to be long waited as the amount of tasks resolving for the Navy purposes was increased more than twofold, the quantity and quality of computing operations improved dramatically. But fulfillment of only computing operations soon became insufficient for the Navy as it was needed to deal with the issue of prospective navy building with the features of integrated and balanced operational system and therefore development of automated command and control systems for the different levels. In March 1961 the Computation Center had been transformed into the 24th R & D Institute of the Ministry of Defense and later took the leading position in military-economic feasibility studies of the Navy development prospects and automation of naval forces command and control.
Solution of issues related with the prospective construction of the Navy as the integrated operational system mostly depended on scientific coverage of the decisions taken by the government and Naval Command. Such coverage was provided by experts of systems study who had succeeded to optimally choose the directions and priorities of Navy’s development, come up with the requirements applicable to warfare and equipment corresponding with the conditions of their operational use. The highly fruitful years of scientific coverage of weapons construction programs the scholars of the Soviet military science had justified the approaches, techniques and practices equal to the world standards, and in the area of statistics systematization they left everybody behind.
All in all the following groups of issues related to the prospective construction of the Navy can be highlighted:
- Foresight of the types, forms, and means of combat struggle at sea as well as goals and objectives of the Navy supervene;
- Selection of criteria for the most efficient fulfillment of tasks by naval forces;
- Argumentation of requirements set up to military characteristics and the level of development of parameters combat systems of ships, aircrafts and other warfare of the navy;
- Envisaging of possible components of promising systems and attainable levels of development of their parameters;
- Comparative analyses of Navy progress of highly developed naval powers;
- Prospective appraisal and evaluation of qualitative composition of naval warfare;
- Determining of efficient numerical strength of the Navy;
- Providing balance of naval warfare composition and expedient distribution of resources for its development.
Foresight of the types, forms, and means of combat struggle at sea was considered the main reference condition for weapons development justification. This was the task of naval warfare theory and the latter provided for applicable methods enabling close relationship with weapons development as it was known types, forms, and means of combat struggle in many ways defined by warfare parameters and vice versa types, forms, and means of combat struggle set a number of requirements to the warfare parameters. The first who developed the method of successive approximation were S.K. Svirin, V.S. Babii, Yu.A. Alexeev, V.N. Khyaninen and others.
Basically the productivity of positive outcomes with the solutions of further tasks and the value of developed proposals was defined in many ways by the accuracy of chosen efficiency criteria. The solution of this issue was greatly contributed by R.A. Chervinskiy, G.O. Barkalaya, A.N. Zoloteev and others.
The greatest value at the stage of prospective systems philosophy forming used to have argumentation of requirements set up to military characteristics on the assumption of analysis of targeted object. Such requirements had been stimulating the scholars and designers to find possible ways to give weapons the required properties. At the stage of determination of developments ways of warfare the greatest attention was paid to the parameters of the prospective weapons. The leading scholars who had been working on the issue were A.L. Zamuraev, V.M. Kolesnikov, G.A. Khoroshilov, Yu.N. Sinchenko, V.B. Naumov, Yu.K. Gavrya, G.V. Sandalov and others.
Every research phase regularly witnessed comparative analyses of Navy progress of highly developed naval powers, comparison of directions, parameters and level of their warfare in order to determine targeted objects, analysis of their properties to have the basis for justification of military characteristics for development of the own naval weapons providing for qualitative superiority. The development of comparative analyses was greatly contributed by V.N. Khyaninen, I.Yu. Nychinin, S.V. Korotkevich, and others.
The issue of warfare composition appraisal lies in the choice of weapons samples that from one side thanks to their military characteristics could have provided for the required types and levels of forcing of adversary’s targets and from the other could have been produced by the industry in sufficient amount in a set period of time. Determining of efficient numerical strength of the Navy was carried out generally with the help of weapons comparative assessment methods taking into account end objectives of combat struggle at sea.
These methods are most generally employed while finding ways of weapons development and also in justification of general operational requirements (GOR), top level specifications (TLS), and in appraisal of projects designs when as the rule specific ships and weapons are being considered. The following people should be credited as contributors into the solution of this problem O.S. Zhukovskiy, Yu.G. Solnyshkova, L.N. Mileiko, G.S. Kondratenko, and others.
The stage of efficient numerical strength determining of the Navy was one the main one and at the same time one of the final in the line of phases making the body of the study on justification of navy’s development prospects. The methods for determination of quantitative composition hold a prominent place in any systems study. In these latter days the real life presses for solution of issues of synthesis and optimization within complex systems consisting of elements bound together by functional connections. Navy systems especially nowadays can be considered as instances of such systems featuring elevated complexity of functioning mechanisms. The urgent necessity in development of methods of complex systems synthesis appeared due to implementation of goal-oriented planning and systems’ development management.
In the Navy the methods of determination of quantitative composition systems took their start from the mid 60’s almost simultaneously with the methods development for military-economic studies and justification of perspectives of naval warfare development. The methods of synthesis are most generally employed while grounding the development trends and weapons programs. The development of these methods is connected with the names of M.D. Iskanderov, V.V. Bulavin and others.
Providing balance of naval warfare composition and expedient distribution of resources for its development is to be resolved at last stage of justification of weapons production plans. The core of program planning method is the way for resolving the given issue. Mathematical formulation of the task of balancing of naval warfare and the principles for issue solution were outstandingly drawn up by S.G. Svirin, G.O. Barkalaya and others.
In 1981 the 24th R & D Institute of the Ministry of Defense as the leading institution within the Ministry of Defense pertaining to resolving of the mentioned issues as well as analysis of combat duties and forces command and control automation in order to fulfill the assigned issues was reorganized into the Central Institute of the Ministry of Defense. For 30 years the specialists of the 24th R & D Institute of the Ministry of Defense developed over 2000 proposals and recommendations with 80% of them implemented in the Navy and industry enabling efficiency increase of the problems handling for 35-30%. The founders of combat service analysis philosophy were A.N. Zoteev, G.V. Kosintsev, M.B. Trophimov, V.I. Dudkin. It is hardly possible to overestimate the contribution of the teaching staff of the Naval Academy who in 1956-1975 had been dealing with the issue of naval warfare improvement and personnel training for the Navy.
As it was already mentioned that in the 60’s the Navy started receiving great numbers of radically new ships armed with ballistic and winged missiles and anti-submarine weapon of project 629 (1959-1962), project 658 (1960-1964), project 667A (1960-1964), nuclear and diesel submarines armed with winged missiles of project 651 (1963-1968), project 675 (1968-1970), project 670 (1970), attack submarines of projects 627, 659 (1960-1964) and later project 671 with variations.
This gave an impetus for the totally new approach in the theory of naval warfare namely usage of the navy for the blowing-up of military and economy strength of an aggressor at his territory, impacting and weakening of its nuclear strikes aimed at this country from the seas.
At that time the most recent trend in naval warfare development was conducting of independent operations with the Navy interacting with other branches of the Armed Forces met the goal objectives mainly by its own activities. Such operations were then called “strategic operations in the ocean theater”.
The creative approach was also applied to the Navy use in cooperation with Army Forces. Unlike the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the first post-war decade such cooperation took the form of Navy’s participation in land theater of operations.
The increase of in value of supporting operations, wide use of electronic warfare, raised role of operational logistics became the distinctive features of the new theory of naval warfare developed in the 60’. The enhancement of naval major tactics is bound to the gift of I.S. Isakova, V.A. Petroshevskiy, A.P. Alexandrov, V.A. Belly, V.S. Lisyutin and other experts.
Lack of adequate means and methods of combating missiles and overestimation of capabilities of nuclear-missile weapon gave a rise to an idea that a carrier strike group, convoy or land forces of the potential enemy could have been destructed with the help of a single submarine or a group of missile-launching aircrafts armed with nuclear weapon. Therefore it was mistakenly assumed as inexpedient to establish coordination between the branches of the naval forces both in combat and operation. Exactly this point of view was expressed by K.A. Stalbo in a discussion on the pages of Morskoi Sbornik magazine in 1960-1961. The head of Tactics Department of the Naval Academy adhered to another standpoint pressing for the necessity of participation of all-arms forces and their coordination in both combat and operation at sea. Initially the first one got the upper hand and even recognized by the command. Eventually it was overturned by theory providing enough reasons.
The researches now featured the development of battle conducting methods against potential enemy possessing powerful defenses that could not be penetrated by a strike from the uniform forces. Battle conducting theory has gained a significant importance. The performance of particular researches required involvement of existing or creation of brand new mathematical tools, wide use of calculation devices, development of common arithmetic reasoning and assessment criterion of the issues under consideration.
During the validation of decisions of operational objectives and running mimic warfare it was theory and skills of personnel training and executing naval operations that practiced to perfection. V.I. Potapov, V.I. Vlasov, B.B. Schukin, Yu.M. Ischeikin, A.N. Popov, G.A. Slyusarev, G.N. Shvetsov and other experts had contributed greatly to the solution of this issue.
Thus the post-war period had witnessed numerous changes of naval armament systems. Subsequently every change needed the revision of naval warfare not only its theoretical but applicable part as well. Every such adjustment had been accompanied by rather punishing work that in many cases resulted in full-scale overall studies. Yet the turning point in the theory of major tactics development appeared to be the transition to nuclear-missile weapons and construction of nuclear-powered submarines. That was nothing but revolution in the art of war, war science that grounded the theories of strategic and operational forces usage.
Table 4. Submarines construction in 1976-1985
This very time the Navy Command and military science came to a conclusion that the military-strategic parity approach provides for not only approximate balance of the forces built and under construction between the opposing sides but the balance in the capability of these sides to instrument the cumulated forces as well. Such a capability mainly depended upon the level of preparedness of the forces in the peacetime. That is why during the reviewing period the combat service as the highest level of Navy battle readiness called even more attention. Table 5 presents data on combat service cruises (sorties) during 1976-1985.
Table 5. Combat service of the Navy in 1976-1985
The analysis of the given data shows that prior to 1981-1982 there was an increasing trend in the numbers of crafts on combat service the trend later flattened and then descended slightly. Besides should before 1979 the amount of sorties of antisubmarine, reconnaissance and naval missile-carrying aviation was rather equal in number then later it increased dramatically.
It should be noted that the combat service during that period reached radically new qualitative basis. In 1976 the Mediterranean Squadron was transformed into the task group comprising no less than 40 naval ships (15-25 before) including 2-3 nuclear submarines, 3-5 diesel submarines, 3-4 large missile carrying surface ships, 7-10 antisubmarine ships including the ones equipped with helicopters and other forces. About the same time officially in the Persian Gulf a task force came into being comprised of the squadrons of ships from the Pacific and Northern Fleets. Two squadrons stayed at sea on the permanent basis far from the home ports and the rest two detachments remained in their bases and put to sea occasionally.
The nuclear submarines (especially NPBMS) started to be used on the strictly regulated cycle with the prescribed sea-to-base ratio (relation of total time on combat service to service life of the ship). Cyclic usage of the forces enabled having their constant amount at combat service (See Table 6). Table 6 demonstrates that the peak of battle readiness of submarine forces in the period under review fell on the first third of the 80’ later the intensity descended slightly. It should be mentioned that yet in the palmy days the SBR of NPBMS was a little bit lower of the same of American SSBN (0.5).
Table 6. Sea-to-base ratio data during 1976-1985
During the considered period the scope of issues to be resolved increased namely in strikes delivery by NPBMS including from the Arctic Ocean with breaking ice when surfacing for missiles firing; land-based targets firing increased for 3-4 times; searching and spying on adversary’s nuclear submarines – 1.5-2 times, hitting carrier task groups - 1.5-2 times.
This time the Russian science including military one was dealing with development and validation of proposals for clearance of causes impacting issues solution. There was a requirement set for nuclear submarines to reduce unmasking mediums especially acoustic fields, proposal to implement more advanced reactors with liquid-metal coolant, utilize titanium alloys for pressure hulls construction enabling diving depth to one thousand meters. As before the fundamental issue to be considered in of antisubmarine assignments was the lack of getting the means of underwater situation understanding and primary detection of submarines (like American system SOSUS covering the half of the World Ocean that cost USA hundreds billions of dollars). As the mean for primary submarine detection the surface ships and submarines were equipped with systems for wakes finding that improved the antisubmarine challenge that time.
The continuous combat service provided for maintenance of favorable operational situation in the most vital areas of the World Ocean for our country. For instance in 1967 and 1973 the prompt build-up of combat service forces in the Mediterranean to the required quantity normalized the situation in the Middle East not allowing the 6th US Fleet to interfere Arab-Israel conflict at Israel’s side that would have led to the escalation of hostilities. In 1983 similar normalizing mission without forces increase was fulfilled by Mediterranean Task Force of the Soviet Navy during conflict in Lebanon.
In 1979 during aggression of China upon Socialist Republic of Vietnam the timely deployment of combat service forces of the Pacific Fleet in the hub areas of East China and South China Seas prevented stepping-up of the Chinese Navy and its attacks against Vietnam from sea. According to the documents related to the combat service in 1976-1985 the continuous presence of Navy’s forces in the flash point of the World Ocean allowed to deterrent aggressive pretensions of some nations (e.g. breaking attack attempts against Libya and Angola, revolution in Guinea, etc)
Thus the naval forces in the 70’s-80’s solve essential combat issues in the peacetime. The Russian science greatly contributed to the Navy’s increase and its putting to sea.
The analysis that had been carried out revealed serious mistakes in Navy’s construction process and the way it had been operated with regarding to commonality in shipbuilding that led to increase of ships’ types and projects and resulted in insufficient balance of naval forces between its attacking part and supporting infrastructure. In consequence of this there was increase ships with expired overhaul life and forced to stand idle awaiting plant repair.
Table 7. The amount of combat service cruises during 1986-1995
The scope of issues had been dealt with before by the forces of combat service was added another issue apparently the major one at that moment of time i.e. participation in the peace-making in world’s flash points. Right with this purpose (resolving of Bosnian conflict) in 1995-1996 the detachment of Russian naval ships headed by aircraft carrier Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov made a cruise to the Mediterranean Sea.
Then what sort of issues the Russian science including military one was to deal with at this stage? The main one was the scientific justification of sufficiency principle for the defense purposes as the parity principle in Navy’s construction has become outdated and the Russian economy at that stage was not capable to materialize it. And what is more the very parity principle in strategic weapons led to such an accumulation of weapons of mass destruction enabling to kill all the living beings on earth and the planet itself. A special commission was called in order to define the efficiency of scientific researches.
The sufficiency principle provides for construction of Armed Forces and its branches as integrated operational systems balanced between their attack subsystems and supporting infrastructures. Only system approach should be laid as the basis for the military science validating the sufficiency principle and without system approach it is meaningless trying to realize the named principle. This very objective is pursued by O.T. Shkiryaev, Yu.N. Sinchenko, A.L. Zamuraev, V.S. Gnitsevich and others.
Military Related Technical Problems of Establishment and Development of the Modern Navy Command and Control System and Ways of their SolutionCommand and control of the naval forces stands for organized process of formulation and delivery to the forces of instructions and signals providing for their efficient usage in pursuing set goals in armed struggle at sea.
The requirements to the qualitative and quantitative parameters of basic features of control and command as a process i.e. efficiency, flexibility, continuity, reliability, and concealment at first hand result from the doctrine of naval strategies and have been developed on the basis of adequacy of naval combat power command and control capabilities.
Administrative and material basis ensuring implementing of command and control process is considered naval command and control system (CCS) comprising of hierarchy of institutions (headquarters, command centers) and control and command means operated by specially trained personnel. Should the first steps in establishment and development of CCS was done by the Russian Navy as a matter of native and international experience of seafaring and naval battles (flagship, signal flags, spyglasses, top men, flagship’s evolutions – as the means of commands and signals passing) then in the early 20th century with the mass-produced various types of ocean-going ships and long-range artillery the further development of CCS was almost impossible without holistic scientific theories and fundamental technical solutions.
Creation of up-to-date CCS by means of the Soviet Navy can be split into two major stages namely early 50’s – mid 70’s, late 70’s – till present. The key factors acted as the basis for the theory and practice of establishment and development of CCS were:
- Orientation of military doctrines of the leading world nation including USSR for the decisive use of nuclear-missile weapon pursuing strategic goals in the armed struggle;
- Transformation of theaters of ocean and sea operations into strategic ones due to the wide construction of nuclear ocean-going fleets by the leading powers and intensive development of nuclear-missile sea-launched weapons.
Change-over to the continuous operational activities of the Navy at the vast sea and ocean theaters of operations necessitated of scientific definition and validation of such features of the Navy like spacial coverage, maneuver effectiveness, battle readiness, economical efficiency.
The new qualitative content and considerably more strict requirements were raised to flexibility, stability and reliability of CCS. This entailed the search for other unconventional with regard to the period of the Great Patriotic War ways of practical approach to the resolution of such military technical issues as:
- Ensure high viability of CSS against nuclear weapon;
- Ensure high viability of CSS in the environment of multiple interference attacks including electronic interference;
- Global acquisition of information needed for decision making of force usage and coming up with the commands and signals of combat control;
- Ensure the capacity to process massive streams of information under pressure of tight schedule at every commanding level;
- Severe reduction if time frames in forces command.
Sci-tech searching of the most efficient solutions of the mentioned issues was primarily aimed at the development of the following:
- Infrastructure of Navy command authorities structure on the new qualitative basis;
- Up-to-date system of forces and facilities for interpreting situation at sea and ocean theaters;
- High-efficiency systems and facilities of communication and data transmission;
- Systems and means of Navy command and control automation.
Every mentioned trend was requiring performing series of science and technical engineering works that in its turn generated a need to engage scientific and technical potential of the whole country. With this end in view the Naval R & D Institute carried out a great number of research works and exploratory developments in order to define and validate the requirements of qualitative and quantitative parameters of CCS. In addition the results of in-depth studies and scientific and technical experiment s applicable to electronics, cybernetics, air and space technology, architecture and construction were taken into account.
Thanks to the combined efforts of the experts of the Naval R & D Institute, Academy of Science, R & D Institutes of other branches the native industry managed for the period of time in view to achieve significant gains and accumulate sufficient scientific and technical reserve with regard to engineering and development of CCS of the Navy.
By early 70’s the central command chain of the Navy and the Fleets received a network of the forces CCS within the protected commanding centers equipped with means of command and control. At the same time a series of experimental, engineering and practical works was carried out aimed at the development of back-up CCS infrastructure designated for maintenance of efficient control of the strategic naval forces and general purpose naval forces for the cases of global nuclear conflict. In particular during the period in consideration the forces were reinforced by ship-based command and control stations that took the form of converted cruisers of project 68U, command ship Kosmonavt Vladimir Komarov, airborne operations centers and radio relay aircrafts based on Il-22 and Tu-142 MRC (maritime reconnaissance and target marking). In addition the first steps were made towards the establishment of elements of land-based mobile CCS component in the way of vehicles and mobile railroad operations centers.
At the third stage the developed scientific and technical solutions pertaining to the development of up-to-date reconnaissance and watching means enabled establishment at the Fleets of entire system for situation interpreting. In particular it was designed and commissioned maritime cosmic reconnaissance systems Legenda that allowed global coverage of seas and oceans areas and prompt delivery of surface targets coordinates directly to the naval attack forces. The Fleets received wings and squadrons of long and medium range reconnaissance aviation comprised of Tu-95R, Tu-16R, Tu-22R aircrafts. The land-based observation facilities were re-equipped allowing the increase of surveillance coverage from two to several tens of kilometers. By this time the long range hydroacoustic surveillance and over-the-horizon radiolocation research and development has advanced significantly.
At the third stage the developed scientific and technical solutions pertaining to the development of high efficiency communication and data transmission means enabled establishment in the 70’s of deployed global communication system of the Navy including involvement of earth satellites namely transponders of Parus space communication system. In addition there were significant gains pertaining to engineering of communication means for infrared and ultraviolet wave bands.
Special part in the fulfillment of requirements set before the process of command and control of naval forces during operations and battle actions played wide introduction of automation means in the activities of operations centers. The pre-condition for designing and implementation of the first home-produced systems and suits of command and control automation was the need to increase efficiency and accuracy of acquisition, accumulation and storage of considerable data amount, perform calculation for the planning purposes of Navy’s tactical employment. It should be noticed that the appearance of electronics and computer technologies in the country in the considered period of time animated the works in this area.
In the mid 60’s the cooperation of industrial institutions under military and scientific support of the 24th R & D Institute of the Navy it was developed a pilot item of the first automated command and control system of the Navy (system AS-4). This suit was implemented at the Northern and Pacific fleets and in the Navy General Staff as well and provided for automated acquisition of data regarding to own force, adversary force and environment condition. To a considerable extent the commissioning of the AS-4 system allowed intensifying and simplifying of controlling activities for the operators and naval command. The operators of the Main Naval Operations Center and Operations Center of the Northern Fleet contributed greatly into implementation and mastering of the advanced technology.
The implementation experience of the first automated command and control system of the Navy by the end of the 70’s provided for a wide range of research and development works and experiments aimed at the upgrade of existing systems and development of radically new automation systems for the Navy tacking into account the latest advances in the area of electronics and cybernetics.
Among some of the major factors that directly impacted the development and scientific validation of the requirements to the parameters and features of Navy CCS of the mid 70’s should be announced the following:
- Redirection of the military doctrines of the leading powers from the “massive nuclear retaliation” to “target selection” thanks to the usage of innovative technologies in the area of precision weapons development;
- Wide implementation of the technological advances i.e. “artificial intelligence” into the military life;
- Large scale involvement of the leading world powers in the development of the programs of global coverage of the World Ocean areas i.e. “transparent ocean”;
- Development of the up-to-the minute means of electronic warfare.
The factors necessitated the raise of qualitative and quantitative standards applicable to CCS of the Navy were to:
- Ensure the guidance of sea-launched precision weapons flight to the targets not from the platform but from the control elements of the higher level;
- Ensure information circulation within CCS in near real time scale;
- Provision of capability of simultaneous integrated control of space, land, water surface and underwater areas of Navy responsibility.
The outcome of the scientific studies had carried out by naval experts gave evidence that the way of the mentioned requirements was the development of integrated CSS of the Navy on the basis of new technology that would enable the possibility to integrate all the process of command and control under real time scale. The major military and technical issues to be resolved at this stage were the following:
- Finding of efficient ways to create highly-accuracy automated means for reconnaissance and observation of different location including utilization of the latest digital signal processing techniques;
- Finding of optimal design of automated networks and data communication channels;
- Selection of efficient technical solutions of direct delivery of commands and signals from the operations centers of the higher level to the forces at sea;
- Selection of efficient ways for introduction of mathematical support of the automation systems.
During the period under review the conjoint studies and experiments carried out by the Naval R & D Institute, the Academy of Sciences, and a number of leading industrial institutions that came to the following results.
By mid 80’s combat command-control system (CCCS) was developed and commissioned for the use of Navy CINC operation centers, the Fleets and their main divisions. This system provided for flexibility in command firstly of the strategic naval forces and main general purpose attack groups.
The leading role in the development and adaptation of the mentioned system was taken by scientific and technical teams of 24th R & D Institute of the Ministry of Defense and scientific-production association (NPO) Mars. Among the scientists and designers contributed greatly to the development of this system the names of a laureate of State Prize Yu.N. Naklakov, M.G. Volkov, V.L. Luschik should be mentioned and of course the chief designer a laureate of State Prize V.V. Alekseichik.
The development of CCCS for the nation’s security purposes had been performed under the supervision of Academicians N.I. Semenikhin and K.N. Trofimov. At the same time the battery of studies was commenced for the development of global automated reconnaissance and observation at sea and ocean theaters.
The plans of the mentioned research and development studies envisaged the ability to equip the Navy, Fleets and directly attack naval groups with highly-accuracy data on adversary’s location in near real time scale. Out of many who worked on the development and automation of reconnaissance and observation the names of a laureate of State Prize Academician A.I. Savin, scholars Yu.V. Alekseev, L.N. Mileiko, chief designers of systems and its components Yu.P. Kuleshov, S.A. Mishukov, A.I. Voronoi, G.D. Litvinov should be remarked.
As the result of research and development works considerable amount of data was accumulated pertaining to the further development of infrastructure and complete large-scale automation of back-up CCS with degree of endurance and interference resistance. There was accomplished a number of engineering developments with regard to establishment of automated systems of ship and land-based naval command and control elements based on the new concepts.
Automated airborne operations center at Il-80 aircraft was developed and passed state tests by the end of the 80’s. Considerable contribution in its development was made by Yu.N. Kalashnikov, Yu.N. Golovko, A.I. Zaparov, and chief designer Yu.V. Peslik.
Simultaneously with the establishment of the new operations centers of the Navy there was started a series of works on the upgrade and development of computer-based message systems and systems of data transmission to submarines and surface ships. There were created the automated communication packages providing for efficient delivery of command information to the naval forces. Considerable contribution in the development of the systems was made by N.F. Directorov, Academician V.I. Miroshnikov and many others.
Upon the completion of works on automation means of information-computing systems AS-4 and CCCS, R & D Institutions of the Navy conjointly with the scientific-production industrial institutions started to carry out research and development program aimed at phased establishment of integrated automated control system Mars. The named program envisaged:
- Selection of engineering solution on integration of separate ACS into the joint ACS;
- Expansion of special mathematical support (SMS) applicable to automation of control process functions;
- Examination of gained world experience and searching for applied was of development of ACS for the Navy in terms of using the latest software hardware.
The data accumulated in the process of the mentioned program fulfillment made it possible to initiate in the late 80’s – early 90’s the actual works on automation of CCS facilities using the worldwide standard information processing technology. The works were the following:
- Introduction of high performance local area networks equipped with personal computers;
- Adoption and implementation of high-level machine languages, up-to-the minute methods of database building;
- Mastering and introduction of “artificial intelligence” ACS methods into SMS.
The whole scope of scientific and practical works on the development and advancing of the up-to-date CCS of the Navy provided all the required combat characteristics enabling efficient command of the naval forces of different levels in all kinds of developments of the unleashed aggression. Lots of efforts were spent by the scholars in development of operational command and control systems.
Development of ACS of the Navy was impossible without resolving critical issues and providing for special mathematical support. The experience gained in the area of ACS development suggested that combat effectiveness is directly dependent on the scope and quality of special mathematical and software support (SMSS). The analysis of the acquired experience in SMS development, its high labor and science intensity required to work out unified scientific, methodical, and engineering basis for the solution of this issue.
In 1976 according to a decree of USSR Council of Ministers in the 24th R & D Institute of the Ministry of Defense there was established the Center of Special Mathematical Support of ACS (RDI SMS since 1988) that was dealing with the variety of issues starting form development of directions and programs for special mathematical and software support of ACS, stipulating of operational and tactical requirements to practical implementation and operational support. S.M. Kostin was the first head of the SMS Center. The major scientific and practical efforts of the Center were aimed at the creation of series of naval operations physical models and a system of dual-sided service-simulating tests of combat struggle at sea as well as development and perfecting of SMS for ACS and training simulators.
The following practical issues were formulated for the Center to fulfill:
- Development of SMSS for ACS MBU-B2 and CCCS, models of operations and battle actions, designed tasks for Fleet’s computer information centers;
- Designing SMS of ships’ combat control information systems (CCIS) and theater and tactical simulation systems and their simulation with the help of computers and later delivery to manufactures for them to install them within ships’ computing system including CCIS suit Omnibus for six submarine projects of the third generation, suits Alleya, Lesorub for surface ships, theater and tactical simulation systems Dialoma, Zapevala, Kollimator.
Within a short period of time the SMS Center has become a leading institution in the area of methodology and technology of automation equipment. Besides that time conjointly with the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (AS UkSSR) the Center was working on the following projects:
- Creation of set of programming tools for ballistic support of naval strategic nuclear forces (NPO Agat);
- Development of basic programming features for information and linguistic support (ILS) ACS More (NPO Mars), AS Yupiter (AS UkSSR), MBU-B2.
The achievements of Center’s activities in 1976-1985 were:
- Software for tactical employment of naval strategic nuclear forces with regard to manufacturing of information-carrying medium;
- Information and linguistic support of ACS More of the first generation and AS Yupiter with regard to development of dictionaries, qualifiers, and data bases;
- Set of physical models of naval operations (battle actions) regarding naval operation support, NPBMS stability, forces deployment, fighting nuclear missile submarines, carrier forces, convoys, attack groups of surface ships as well as supporting landing operations and commercial shipping.
The results of the studies were materialized in MBU-B2, AS Yupiter, and ACS More of the first generation.
These years gave a start to the schools of mathematical programming, operations research and battle actions simulation they were led by laureate of State Prize Sh.K. Vakhitov, G.A. Velichko, I.S. Novikov and S.M. Kostin. The greatest contribution in the achievements of the results was made by N.G. Nikitin, V.A. Pavlovich, V.S. Chernov, V.L. Rodin, S.V. kochergin and S.I. Cheremushkin.
In 1986-1995 the Center was dealing with the following major issues:
- Development of special mathematical and programming support of automation control means for naval strategic nuclear forces, ACS More, AS Dozor-M;
- Formulating scientific methods for systems engineering of programming tools of the local area network (LAN) using the latest achievements in the information processing technology;
- Establishment of service-simulating tests of naval operations (battle actions);
- Utilization of programming support of automation control means for process automation in planning of Navy tactical employment;
- Development of prototype of graphics station at simulation stands;
- Provision scientific, methodological and processing compatibility of SMS of control elements of the Navy.
Conjointly with the Institutions of the Academy of Sciences and industrial organizations the following research trends were engaged:
- Engineering of ballistic support system for the tactical employment of naval strategic nuclear forces (State Rocket Center of Machine Building Design Bureau named for Academician V.P. Makeev, NPO Agat);
- Introduction of local area networks in the Navy operations centers (NPO Algoritm, CJSC Programprom, NPO Mars, NPO Kometa, NPO Kibernetica);
- Creation of systems computers security and unauthorized access protection of software and data storages (Saint-Petersburg State Technical University NPO Mars, company Konfident, OJSC Nienshants-Zaschita).
Research and development activities of the Center in 1986-1995 resulted in:
- Development of computing means for detailed planning of tactical employment of naval strategic nuclear forces;
- Justification local area network of Navy combat control group of 20 automation-equipped working places;
- Development of application packages for automation-equipped working places in Navy command and control organizations;
- Introduced simulated tactical operations system (STOS) of the Navy with integrated computer network;
- Determination of software packages for quality certification of automation processes of Navy command and control.
The research and development results were materialized in ACS More of the second generation, AS Dozor-M, Inford-VMF-1, STOS Azov. The most distinguished scholars involved in these researches were G.D. Litvinov, V.V. Zemlyanukhin, I.N. Zadvornov, V.S. Potekhin, Yu.P. Guschin, A.M. Zubakha, V.I. Sedov.
All the activities with regard to mathematical support of ACS and automation equipment used to have and still have clear-cut scientific and application-oriented nature and ultimately take the form of handing over of an end product to a customer or implementation of developed products into systems. There are over 30 techniques and tactical operations physical models, 56 application software packages for operators commissioned in the Armed Forces. STOS Azov and computer network in the Headquarters of the Pacific Fleet are in the process of pilot operation. Right now the work of SMS R & D Institute is aimed at the automation of the activities of Navy command and control bodies with the help of personal computer networks and up-to-date computer technologies.