30.08.10Let us return 20 years back. With the beginning of so-called "perestroika" when all values previously seemed to be unbreakable were revised, and all investments which didn't guarantee immediate incomes and counters piled with goods were called in question, there were also some doubts whether the former superpower really needed the Army and the Navy.
Text: RusNavy.com, D. Yerofeev
Combat Capability [42%], Role and Missions, Structure of the Navy, in-service ships, surface ships, submarines, chronology.
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Part II. Ideological bomb
Among other topics, the matter of building and maintenance costs of aircraft carriers was also in the public limelight under overall and then-popular refrain like "what the budget money is squandered on?" Basically, at that time every columnist specialized in "politically urgent" pseudo-military themes and normally familiar with arms and doctrines only thank to school pre-service training program and translated articles from foreign glossy magazines, could get material benefits by practicing a threadbare themes like "how much do taxpayers pay for one submarine/tank division/strategic bomber etc".
Generally, those "discussions" were hold in two directions. One part of inksters was counting how much commercial products could be made instead of one aircraft carrier; another group – the most "progressive" in defense issues – deliberated what should be purchased for land forces reminding that Russia is entirely a "land power" and needs mighty ocean-going navy only to fulfill "imperial ambitions" which "should undoubtedly be given up". As for them, Russia needed only littoral, coastwise, or so called "mosquito fleet", capable only to defend the closest frontiers and scarify poachers and smugglers.
This ideological bomb seriously damaged Russia's defense capacity. The fifth column had done its part well. Public mind was strongly and permanently convinced that navy is an expensive and useless toy for cracked admirals and alcoholic officers.
Time has put all things in order. Today it stands to reason that Russian Navy does need an aircraft-carrying component. Recent local and almost-global conflicts with permanent and highly effective involvement of these floating airfields made not only the military and politicians but even common people take notice of aircraft carriers' role.
Table of contents
Part I. The story of Soviet carriers
Part II. Ideological bomb
Part III. And so the need was swelling…
Part IV. What kind of carriers and fighters do we need?
Part V. Catapult or ski-ramp?
Part VI. Choosing designer and shipyard
Part VII. Renewed Navy headed by a carrier